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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
STATE V. SYED:  A DEFENDANT IS NOT PREJUDICED WHEN 
COUNSEL FAILS TO INVESTIGATE AN ALIBI WITNESS UNLESS 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY THE TESTIMONY 
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE VERDICT. 
  
By: Justin Ellis 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that prevailing professional norms 
obligated defense counsel to investigate a provided alibi witness and that not 
doing so was deficient.  State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 96, 204 A.3d 139, 153 
(2019).  However, the defendant was not prejudiced by this deficiency 
because there was not a significant or substantial possibility that a jury would 
have reached a different verdict given the potential testimony compared to 
the totality of the evidence.  Id. 93, 205 A.3d at 158.  Additionally, the court 
held that the defendant waived his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
by not including the basis in his original petition for post-conviction relief.  
Id. at 105, 204 A.3d at 165.  
     Adnan Syed (“Syed”) was convicted on February 25, 2000, by the Circuit 
Court of Baltimore City for the first-degree murder of Hae Min Lee (“Lee”), 
as well as other charges.  The State’s case comprised of both direct and 
circumstantial evidence that focused on the timeline of Syed’s actions on the 
day of the murder.  Some of the most compelling evidence came from the 
testimony of Jay Wilds (“Wilds”) and cell phone tower data.  Wilds testified 
that on January 13, 1999: Syed had threatened to kill Lee, that he saw Lee 
dead in the trunk of her car, that Syed bragged he had strangled her, and that 
Wilds assisted Syed to bury the body in Leakin Park.  The State then 
introduced cell phone tower data that showed Syed’s cell phone in Leakin 
Park when it received two calls at 7:09 PM and 7:16 PM, the timeframe Wilds 
testified they were burying the body.  
     While awaiting his initial trial, Syed provided his defense counsel with a 
possible alibi witness, Asia McClain (“McClain”). McClain wrote Syed a 
letter dated March 1, 1999, offering to help account for his whereabouts on 
the day of the murder. The letter stated that she talked to Syed at the 
Woodlawn Public Library between 2:30 and 2:40 PM.  However, Syed’s 
defense counsel failed to investigate McClain’s claim before the trial began. 
     After his conviction in February 2000, Syed filed a timely direct appeal to 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, where the conviction was 
affirmed.  Ten years later, Syed then filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging he had received ineffective counsel, advancing nine bases to support 
his claim.  A post-conviction hearing occurred in October 2012, that 
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concluded with the court denying relief on January 6, 2014.  Syed then filed 
a timely application for leave to appeal requesting that the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland remand the case to consider an affidavit from McClain.  
The application was granted, and the case was remanded.  
     At this point, Syed advanced for the first time a claim of ineffective 
counsel based on his defense attorney’s failure to challenge cell tower 
evidence at trial.  At the completion of the hearing, the post-conviction court 
held that while Syed’s trial counsel was deficient for not investigating 
McClain as an alibi witness, he did not suffer prejudice despite this 
deficiency.  However, the court held that Syed did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his ineffective counsel claim.  Therefore, the court vacated 
the convictions and granted a new trial, which the State appealed.   
     The Court of Special of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the order of the 
post-conviction court and agreed that Syed’s defense counsel was deficient 
by not investigating McClain as an alibi witness.  The Court of Special 
Appeals differentiated from the lower court’s holding that the deficiency 
prejudiced Syed.  Nonetheless, the court held that Syed was precluded from 
advancing his ineffective counsel because it was not one of the nine bases in 
the original post-conviction petition. The State then filed a petition for writ 
of certiorari while Syed filed a conditional cross-petition for writ of 
certiorari, both of which were granted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.   
     In order to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment violation due to 
ineffective counsel, the Court of Appeals applied the two-prong test 
established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. Syed, 463 Md. 
at 74-75, 204 A.3d at 147.  The test requires that the defendant must 
demonstrate that their counsel performed deficiently and that the deficient 
performance created prejudice.  Id. at 75, 204 A.3d 147.  The court held that 
prevailing professional norms obligated Syed’s defense counsel to 
investigate McClain as an alibi witness and not doing so fell below the 
reasonable standard of judgment.  Id. at 82, 204 A.3d at 152.  Subsequently, 
the court did not find any evidence to support the premise that not 
investigating McClain was a tactical decision or part of the trial strategy.  Id. 
at 84, 204 A.3d at 153.  The State argued that when a record is silent 
concerning trial strategy, that deference is given to the attorney and relief 
should be denied. Id. at 85, 204 A.3d at 153.  The Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument holding that the inability of Syed’s trial counsel to explain her 
trail strategy, due to her death, should not be held against him.  Id.   
     After finding the defense counsel deficient, the Court of Appeals then 
examined whether Syed was prejudiced by the deficient performance.  Syed, 
463 Md. at 86-87, 204 A.3d at 154.  When determining if a defendant is 
prejudiced, a court will consider whether or not the verdict would have been 
different if not for the deficient performance.  Id. at 86, 204 A.3d at 154.  The 
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court found that the possible testimony of McClain would have contradicted 
Syed’s statements to police and testimony, impacting his credibility.  Id. at 
93, 204 A.3d at 158.  Further, the court determined the possible testimony 
would not have undermined the State’s case consisting of direct and 
circumstantial evidence and relying heavily on the testimony of Wilds. Id.  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Syed was not 
prejudiced by his defense counsel’s deficient performance because, given the 
totality of the evidence, the possible testimony from McClain did not provide 
a significant or substantial possibility of a different verdict.  Id. at 93-94, 204 
A.3d at 158.  
     The Court of Appeals then considered whether Syed knowingly and 
intelligently waived his claim of ineffective counsel.  Syed, 463 Md. at 97, 
204 A.3d at 161.  The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”) 
provides that if a cognizable claim is not included in the petition for post-
conviction relief, there is a presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver.  
Id. at 98-99, 204 A.3d at 161-62.  Syed argued his claim was premised on a 
fundamental right, thus requiring an affirmative knowing and intelligent 
waiver that is unable to be presumed.  Id. at 97, 204 A.3d at 161.  The court 
disagreed that Syed’s claim was fundamental and affirmed the holding of the 
Special Court of Appeals.  Id. at 103, 204 A.3d at 164.  Accordingly, Syed 
was precluded from raising a claim of ineffective counsel for failure to 
challenge cell tower evidence due to this presumption.  Id. at 105, 204 A.3d 
at 165. 
     The dissent differed from the majority finding that Syed was prejudiced 
by deficient counsel. Syed, 463 Md. at 135, 204 A.3d at 183.  When the 
State’s case is primarily based on a timeline of events, the dissent argued that 
any evidence that could break the chain of events, which could also create 
reasonable doubt in a juror.  Id. at 139, 204 A.3d at 185.  Specifically, the 
State failed to offer direct evidence to account for Syed’s whereabouts at their 
determined time of death for Lee.  Id. at 138, 204 A.3d at 184-85.  McClain’s 
testimony would have placed Syed in a different location from Lee at the 
estimated time of her death.  Id. at 140, 204 A.3d at 186.  The dissent argues 
that the jurors not hearing this testimony could have had a significant effect 
on their decision.  Id. at 141, 204 A.3d at 187.  Therefore, the dissent would 
have affirmed the ruling of the Court of Special Appeals.  Id. 
     In State v Syed, the Court of Appeals found that the failure by defense 
counsel to investigate a provided alibi witness constitutes a deficient 
performance under the definition provided in Strickland.  This ruling is 
significant because it reinforces the duty of defense attorneys to investigate 
all possible alibi witnesses.  While it does not specify that every alibi witness 
must be interviewed, defense counsel is required to investigate the witnesses.  
The holding also affirms permitting only one petition for post-conviction 
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relief from a defendant.  This draws a comparison to one writ of habeas 
corpus at the federal level.  Permitting one petition is important for judicial 
economy and the efficiency of the courts, as well as having a sense of finality 
in criminal cases. 
